That is, regardless of whether the topic is descriptive or normative, scientific or ethical, pragmatists tend to view it as an opportunity for genuine inquiry that incorporates truth-apt assertions. This broadly cognitivist attitude—that normative statements are truth-apt—is related to how pragmatic theories of truth de-emphasize the metaphysical project. As a result, from a pragmatic standpoint one of the problems with the correspondence theory of truth is that it can undermine the truth-aptness of normative claims.
If, as the correspondence theory proposes, a necessary condition for the truth of a normative claim is the existence of a normative fact to which it corresponds, and if the existence of normative facts is difficult to account for normative facts seem ontologically distinct from garden-variety physical facts , then this does not bode well for the truth-aptness of normative claims or the point of posing, and inquiring into, normative questions Lynch If the correspondence theory of truth leads to skepticism about normative inquiry, then this is all the more reason, according to pragmatists, to sidestep the metaphysical project in favor of the speech-act and justification projects.
As we have seen, pragmatic theories of truth take a variety of different forms. To begin with, and unlike many theories of truth, these theories focus on the pragmatics of truth-talk: that is, they focus on how truth is used as an essential step toward an adequate understanding of the concept of truth indeed, this come close to being an oxymoron. More specifically, pragmatic theories look to how truth is used in epistemic contexts where people make assertions, conduct inquiries, solve problems, and act on their beliefs.
By prioritizing the speech-act and justification projects, pragmatic theories of truth attempt to ground the concept of truth in epistemic practices as opposed to the abstract relations between truth-bearers such as propositions or statements and truth-makers such as states of affairs appealed to by correspondence theories MacBride Pragmatic theories also recognize that truth can play a fundamental role in shaping inquiry and assertoric discourse—for example, by functioning as a norm of these practices—even when it is not explicitly mentioned.
In this respect pragmatic theories are less austere than deflationary theories which limit the use of truth to its generalizing and disquotational roles. And, finally, pragmatic theories of truth draw no limits, at least at the outset, to the types of statements, topics, and inquiries where truth may play a practical role. If it turns out that a given topic is not truth-apt, this is something that should be discovered as a characteristic of that subject matter, not something determined by having chosen one theory of truth or another Capps Pragmatic theories of truth have faced several objections since first being proposed.
Some of these objections can be rather narrow, challenging a specific pragmatic account but not pragmatic theories in general this is the case with objections raised by other pragmatic accounts.
This section will look at more general objections: either objections that are especially common and persistent, or objections that pose a challenge to the basic assumptions underlying pragmatic theories more broadly. Some objections are as old as the pragmatic theory of truth itself.
While James offered his own responses to many of these criticisms see especially his [] , versions of these objections often apply to other and more recent pragmatic theories of truth for further discussion see Haack ; Tiercelin One classic and influential line of criticism is that, if the pragmatic theory of truth equates truth with utility, this definition is obviously!
In short, there seems to be a clear and obvious difference between describing a belief as true and describing it as useful:. Russell [ 98]. So whether truth is defined in terms of utility, long-term durability or assertibility etc. In other words, whatever concept a pragmatic theory uses to define truth, there is likely to be a difference between that concept and the concept of truth e.
A second and related criticism builds on the first. Perhaps utility, long-term durability, and assertibility etc. This seems initially plausible and might even serve as a reasonable response to the first objection above. Falling back on an earlier distinction, this would mean that appeals to utility, long-term durability, and assertibility etc.
However, without some account of what truth is, or what the necessary and sufficient conditions for truth are, any attempt to offer criteria of truth is arguably incomplete: we cannot have criteria of truth without first knowing what truth is. If so, then the justification project relies on and presupposes a successful resolution to the metaphysical project, the latter cannot be sidestepped or bracketed, and any theory which attempts to do so will give at best a partial account of truth Creighton ; Stebbing And a third objection builds on the second.
Putting aside the question of whether pragmatic theories of truth adequately address the metaphysical project or address it at all , there is also a problem with the criteria of truth they propose for addressing the justification project. Pragmatic theories of truth seem committed, in part, to bringing the concept of truth down to earth, to explaining truth in concrete, easily confirmable, terms rather than the abstract, metaphysical correspondence of propositions to truth-makers, for example.
The problem is that assessing the usefulness etc. Far from making the concept of truth more concrete, and the assessment of beliefs more straightforward, pragmatic theories of truth thus seem to leave the concept as opaque as ever. These three objections have been around long enough that pragmatists have, at various times, proposed a variety of responses. One response to the first objection, that there is a clear difference between utility etc.
It has been argued that pragmatic theories are not about finding a word or concept that can substitute for truth but that they are, rather, focused on tracing the implications of using this concept in practical contexts. It is even possible that James—the main target of Russell and others—would agree with this response. To be sure, pragmatic theories of truth have often been framed as providing criteria for distinguishing true from false beliefs.
The distinction between offering a definition as opposed to offering criteria would suggest that criteria are separate from, and largely inferior to, a definition of truth. However, one might question the underlying distinction: as Haack argues,. If meaning is related to use as pragmatists generally claim then explaining how a concept is used, and specifying criteria for recognizing that concept, may provide all one can reasonably expect from a theory of truth.
Deflationists have often made a similar point though, as noted above, pragmatists tend to find deflationary accounts excessively austere. Even so, there is still the issue that pragmatic criteria of truth whatever they are do not provide useful insight into the concept of truth. If this concern is valid, then pragmatic criteria, ironically, fail the pragmatic test of making a difference to our understanding of truth.
In that case it is not clear what good it serves to have a pragmatic criterion of truth. Pragmatic theories of truth might try to sidestep this objection by stressing their commitment to both the justification and the speech-act project.
While pragmatic approaches to the justification project spell out what truth means in conversational contexts—to call a statement true is to cite its usefulness, durability, etc.
This has the benefit of showing how the concept of truth—operating as a norm of assertion, say—makes a real difference to our understanding of the conditions on assertoric discourse. Pragmatic theories of truth are, as a result, wise to pursue both the justification and the speech-act projects. By itself, pragmatic approaches to the justification project are likely to disappoint.
These classic objections to the pragmatic theory of truth raise several important points. For one thing, they make it clear that pragmatic theories of truth, or at least some historically prominent versions of it, do a poor job if viewed as providing a strict definition of truth.
As Russell and others noted, defining truth in terms of utility or similar terms is open to obvious counter-examples. This does not bode well for pragmatic attempts to address the metaphysical project. As a result, pragmatic theories of truth have evolved often by focusing on the justification and speech-act projects instead. This is not to say that each of the above objections have been met.
It is still an open question whether the metaphysical project can be avoided as many pragmatic theories attempt to do e. It is also an open question whether, as they evolve in response to these objections, pragmatic theories of truth invite new lines of criticism. The source of this objection rests with the tendency of pragmatic theories of truth to treat truth epistemically, by focusing on verifiability, assertibility, and other related concepts.
Some see, e. For similar reasons, some have accused pragmatic theories of denying bivalence Allen Hermanson What results, accordingly, is not a theory of truth, but rather a theory of justification, warranted assertibility, or some other epistemic concept. This objection has persisted despite inspiring a range of responses.
At one extreme some, such as Rorty, have largely conceded the point while attempting to defuse its force. As noted earlier, Rorty grants that truth is not objective in the traditional sense while also attempting to undercut the very distinction between objectivity and relativism. Hookway ; see also Hookway and Legg Finally, others attempt to undercut the distinction between realism and antirealism though without making concessions to antirealism.
Da Costa and French offer a formal account of pragmatic truth that, they argue, can benefit both sides of the realism-anti-realism debate though they themselves prefer structural realism. We find, in other words, an assortment of replies that run the gamut from embracing anti-realism to defending realism to attempting to undermine the realist-antirealist distinction itself. Evidently, there is no consensus among pragmatic theories of truth as to the best line of response against this objection.
In a way, this should be no surprise: the objection boils down to the charge that pragmatic theories of truth are too epistemic, when it is precisely their commitment to epistemic concepts that characterizes pragmatic theories of truth. Responding to this objection may involve concessions and qualifications that compromise the pragmatic nature of these approaches.
Or responding may mean showing how pragmatic accounts have certain practical benefits—but these benefits as well as their relative importance are themselves contentious topics.
As a result, we should not expect this objection to be easily resolvable, if it can be resolved at all. Despite being the target of significant criticism from nearly the moment of its birth, the pragmatic theory of truth has managed to survive and, at times, even flourish for over a century.
Because the pragmatic theory of truth has come in several different versions, and because these versions often diverge significantly, it can be difficult to pin down and assess generally. Adding to the possible confusion, not all those identified as pragmatists have embraced a pragmatic theory of truth e. Viewed more positively, pragmatic theories have evolved and matured to become more sophisticated and, perhaps, more plausible over time.
With the benefit of hind-sight we can see how pragmatic theories of truth have stayed focused on the practical function that the concept of truth plays: first, the role truth plays within inquiry and assertoric discourse by, for example, signaling those statements that are especially useful, well-verified, durable, or indefeasible and, second, the role truth plays in shaping inquiry and assertoric discourse by providing a necessary goal or norm.
It is also possible to ask this question of the pragmatic theory of truth itself: what difference does this theory make? One answer is that, by focusing on the practical function of the concept of truth, pragmatic theories highlight how this concept makes certain kinds of inquiry and discourse possible. In contrast, as Lynch notes, some accounts of truth make it difficult to see how certain claims are truth-apt:.
Under the assumption that truth is always and everywhere causal correspondence, it is a vexing question how these true thoughts can be true. Lynch 34, emphasis in original.
If that is so, then pragmatic theories have the advantage of preserving the possibility and importance of various types of inquiry and discourse. Additional comments and suggestions are obviously welcome. History of the Pragmatic Theory of Truth 1. Neo-Pragmatic Theories of Truth 3. Truth as a Norm of Inquiry and Assertion 4. Common Features 5. Critical Assessments 5.
History of the Pragmatic Theory of Truth The history of the pragmatic theory of truth is tied to the history of classical American pragmatism. This gives us the pragmatic meaning of truth and leads Peirce to conclude, in another frequently-quoted passage, that: All the followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which they can be applied.
In Peirce writes that: Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief. Misak 1. In the lectures published as Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking James writes that: Ideas…become true just in so far as they help us get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience, to summarize them and get about among them by conceptual short-cuts instead of following the interminable succession of particular phenomena.
James adds to the previous quote by making the connection between truth and utility explicit: Any idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally.
And, more generally: Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc. To be true is to be verified: Truth happens to an idea. Free word lists and quizzes from Cambridge. Tools to create your own word lists and quizzes.
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Nor can Napoleon necessarily help. Anniversary events have been overshadowed by revisionist claims that Boney was a shameless misogynist who backed slavery and destroyed the republic. The old ambivalence persists. In short, a Napoleon-style putsch. The government was scandalised, but a poll found most people supported the idea.
The coup was fantasy.
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