Some Somalis are very devout and promote greater Islamization of society al-Islah activities fall into this category but are otherwise apolitical. Still others embrace aspects of political Islam, such as the expansion of Sharia courts to maintain law and order, but are uninterested in an Islamic state. Of those who support al-Ittihad, some view it as a tactical and short-term affiliation, others as a real commitment.
Of those committed to al-Ittihad, most are concerned with an international rather than a domestic agenda. And even among those Somalis who want to harness al-Ittihad for violent acts abroad, most are primarily focused on waging jihad in Ethiopia. Somalis who actively support al-Ittihad as part of a global struggle are, by all ac counts, very few in number. Notably, no Somali has appeared in leadership levels of Al Qaeda.
The individual suspects the United States may identify in Somalia are likely to be no more than mid-level personalities in Al Qaeda. From that standpoint, Somalia poses a much lower threat than many other countries. What this suggests is that even within al-Ittihad in Somalia there are significant differences of view over a wide range of issues. Those differences need to be understood if policies toward the movement are to be effective. When one considers the extremely fractious nature of Somali clannism, combined with the schismatic tendencies of radical religious movements, it is reasonable to conclude that the Islamist movements in Somali society are and will continue to be plagued by constant divisions, internal tensions and differences in tactics.
One stark example of tactical differences has to do with how local al-Ittihad groups choose to respond to the activities of Western and U. In Gedo region, the local Marehan clan Islamists were quite eager to meet and work with external aid agencies and Western researchers, even to the point of enjoying cordial relations with European and Ameri can workers.
After the U. By contrast, in Puntland, al-Ittihad has gener ally stayed aloof but has not actively interfered with Western aid operations. Non-Somali agents operating inside Somalia, however, are another matter. These fall into several different categories. One group consists of missionaries and educators, typically working in Islamic aid agencies and schools to promote Islamic values and behavior inside Somalia.
This is mainly linked to the Saudi-sponsored al-Islah movement. There are also a small number of non-Somali Muslims living in the country for private, benign reasons — mainly conducting business, perhaps married to a Somali. A third group are non-Somali Muslims working with international aid agencies. A final group of non-Somali Muslims are individuals suspected of using Somalia as a safe haven from which to train and indoctrinate adherents, plan and organize operations, smuggle materiel, launder or divert money, and escape external observation.
This is the scenario that most worries American security analysts. As the United States focuses more of its intelligence assets on Somalia, the degree to which non-Somali radicals are actually in place in the country will become clearer. At this time, there is little evidence suggesting that this is a significant threat. It is difficult to come up with even rough estimates of the numbers of non-Somali Muslims in country. One source estimates that about mainly Pakistanis and Arabs live in Hargeisa city alone.
Estimates for Mogadishu are simply unavailable. In no locations, including Somaliland, do local authorities have the capacity to monitor these populations. Unlike Afghanistan, where Arab and other Muslims serving in the mujahedeen were generally welcomed, Somalia is decidedly less welcoming for non-Somalis with ulterior political agendas, as external Islamic movements have learned or will soon learn.
Local Somalis will insist that any foreign presence be linked to local benefits — jobs, contracts, cash payments. The more that local Somalis perceive that foreigners need them as a base, the harder the bargain they will negotiate and renegotiate. Somalis and Arabs have mixed feelings about one another, and Somalis, always sensitive to slights and humiliation, often bristle at the paternalistic tone Arabs can take with them.
Islamic cells will have the same difficulties faced by international aid agencies, finding themselves embroiled in local clan disputes, extortion, threats, cultural misunderstandings and other local intrigues. Initially, the Somali response to the war on terrorism was mixed. There were some street protests in support of Bin Laden, but nearly all political and community leaders have condemned the September 11 terrorist attacks and expressed a desire to assist the United States in tracking down terrorists.
Debates in tea shops and on street corners appear to be framed by typically pragmatic Somali calculations of how their interests are affected, some arguing the country depends more on the Islamic world, others that the country is best served by continued links to the West. The fact that Islamic aid organizations are very active in Somalia, while the West has generally abandoned and ignored the country since , is a worrisome reminder that an important long-term goal in the war on terrorism — winning the hearts and minds of local communities — is a game that the United States cannot win if it declines to play.
By late , the war on terrorism entered a new, expanded phase, and Somalia found itself on a short list of countries likely to be the next targets of American military action. Somalis felt that their largest company was accorded no due process by the United States, which offered little direct evidence to support its claim that the company is linked to Al Qaeda. Intense and occasionally very inaccurate media speculation that Somalia would be the next target in the war on terrorism, combined with American aerial surveillance, naval interdictions off the coast, and the coincidental release of the film Black Hawk Down has created a siege mentality in Mogadishu and a crisis of confidence.
Anti-Western sentiment is fueled by frustration and fear that Somalia is being scapegoated. Meanwhile, all major political groupings in the country continue to express public interest in partnering with the United States to apprehend terrorist suspects inside the country. These appeals are essentially driven by the hope of parleying anti-terrorism into foreign aid.
No doubt the members of the TNG see in the war on terrorism a new opportunity to attract external patronage. The line of argument already coming out of Mogadishu is that if the West wants to insure that no external terrorist cells operate inside Somalia, it must support a local authority that can police the country — namely, the TNG.
Notably, political leadership in Puntland, Somaliland and the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council a loose coalition of pro-Ethiopian, anti-TNG factions are making similar appeals. There are other ways Somali political actors will seek to exploit the war on terrorism to their own advantage. The most predictable tactic will be to discredit rivals by accusing them either of being al-Ittihad members or of being fronts for or puppets of al-Ittihad.
Their hope will be that the United States and Ethiopia will provide them with support to eliminate this threat. Abdullahi Yusuf has engaged in this tactic against his Puntland rivals for some time now; Hussein Aideed is doing the same against the TNG. If external actors are not careful, they run the risk of being misled and manipulated by local power struggles and clan intrigues. Ethiopia itself has been a principal source of exaggerated claims of Islamic terrorism inside Somalia.
It is hostile to the TNG and seeks to discredit it by accusing it of being a Trojan horse for al-Ittihad. Somalia will unquestionably earn considerable attention from the United States and the rest of the world as the war on terrorism expands beyond the immediate confines of Afghanistan. That Somalia could serve as an alternative base of operations for Al Qaeda is, on one level, self-evident.
Somalia bears striking resemblance to Afghanistan in some ways. It is a collapsed state with only a few weak and scattered regional political authorities of any consequence. It is an Islamic society, deeply clannish and pastoral. It is overwhelmed by desperate levels of poverty, disease and underdevelopment. Its chronic insecurity has driven out most external aid organizations, journalists and others, making it an easy base for unmonitored operations.
Some of its clan militias have shown themselves capable of directly and successfully opposing a superpower on Somali soil. Prudence alone dictates that Somalia be monitored carefully for heightened Al Qaeda activities there.
But the analysis presented in this study also suggests that, on a deeper level, Somalia is not an especially attractive location for Al Qaeda or similar radical networks. The highly fractious nature of Somali clannism, the politics of expediency and pragmatism that leads to so many broken alliances and betrayals, the overwhelming capacity of Somali communities to ensnare external actors in their local feuds, and the enormous difficulty of keeping secrets in a society that deals in the currency of information all suggest that Somalia is hardly an ideal base for organizations with a desire for secrecy and control.
A much more likely scenario is that Somalia will prove useful to Al Qaeda and others as a location for short-term projects — transshipment of people, goods and money in transit to other countries. Somalia could, in other words, play a niche role in a transnational division of labor for Islamic terrorist movements. Permanent Islamist cells are more likely to thrive in highly urban, multi-ethnic, corrupt and poorly policed settings where terrorists can blend in and buy off police and customs officials.
Meanwhile, the immediate key to an effective and informed policy in Somalia is recognition of the wide diversity of positions in its Islamist politics, and the wide range of positions even among Somali members of al-Ittihad. There can be little margin for error in assessing and responding to the many faces of political Islam in the Horn of Africa. A boilerplate approach that downplays these differences by viewing political Islam as monolithic is likely to produce policies that worsen Western security concerns in the region.
In the long term, enhanced security for both the West and the people of the Horn of Africa as a whole requires a much more serious and sustained effort to address the overwhelming crises of political and economic underdevelopment. One feature of many of the states that serve as safe havens for Islamic radicals — Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia — is that they are all failed economies, often little more than labor reserves for the affluent states of the Gulf and the West.
Most belong to the Sunni branch of Islam and the Shafi'i school of Islamic jurisprudence. Islam is strongly linked to the Somali national identity, providing a unified identity for all Somalis regardless of their clan affiliations or cultural backgrounds.
Religion is a key aspect of everyday life for all Somalis. Somalis tend to be more religious than some other Muslim African populations. However, although they may be very devout, Somalis are quite tolerant within the Islamic tradition. Islam was introduced to Somalia in the ninth century CE. Somalis traditionally practise quite a moderate form of Islam, influenced by Sufism. However, the Salafi movement has gained more political influence in recent decades.
It is centred around the concept of looking back to a prior historical period in an effort to understand how the contemporary world should be ordered. Sunni Islamic traditions are deeply infused in the personal, political and legal lives of most Somalis. Religion directly influences governance and daily life. Interpretations of Islam and levels of conservatism vary throughout the country. For example, reverence of Allah is quite evident in the way many people speak; it is common to slip praise into casual conversation.
Almost all towns have a mosque where men attend special prayer services every Friday. The extremist militant group controls many areas in south-central Somalia and continues to carry out deadly terror attacks both in Somalia and surrounding countries.
Founded in A. It is also possible that Islam came to Somalia through contacts with Persian and Arab merchants and seamen who founded settlements along the Somali coast 1, or more years ago. Before Islam reached the Somalis, quarrels over the succession to leadership had led to a split of the Islamic community into the Sunni orthodox and the Shia from Shiat Ali, or partisans of Ali as the legitimate successor to Muhammad. The overwhelming majority of Somalis are Sunni Muslims.
The word islam means "submission to God," and a Muslim is one who has submitted. The religion's basic tenet is stated in its creed: "There is no god but God Allah and Muhammad is His prophet. Four of these duties may be modified by the situation in which believers find themselves. If they are ill, they may pray without prostrations and reduce the number of times they pray from the obligatory five to three.
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